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Can you easily form mental pictures from the descriptions
of scenery that are so frequently met with in novels and
books of travel? More than 100 years ago Francis Galton
[1] sent out a list of questions, including this one, to gather
statistics on the character of mental imagery. Many people
reported vivid mental imagery, but not the scientists on
his list. “To my astonishment”, Galton reported, “I found
that the great majority of the men of science to whom I
first applied protested that mental imagery was unknown
to them”. This response, which Galton attributed to a
“mental deficiency”, might more kindly be attributed to
excessive scrupulosity. Scientists like to be exact in their
usage, and, judging by one of the responses Galton prints,
these eminent fellows may have considered that examin-
ing a visual mental image was not the same as inspecting a
painting: a mental image has a more sketchy character,
and should be thought of more as a symbolic description.
Whatever the explanation for Galton’s curious postbag
from his colleagues, the question of whether visual
imagery is pictorial or symbolic is one that has long inter-
ested philosophers and scientists, and has given rise to
what is called the ‘imagery debate’ [2,3]. With the advent
of brain scanning techniques, it has become possible to
sharpen some of the questions underlying this debate; in
particular, one can ask whether the parts of the brain
active in visual imagery are those that represent visual
events in a ‘pictorial’ manner. 
As I shall describe shortly, the areas in the cortex that
belong to an early stage of the visual pathway are laid out
in topographic correspondence with the retina, and can
therefore be thought of as representing a sort of picture of
the visual input, whereas later areas appear to represent
visual data more symbolically. Several groups have shown
that visual imagery produces activity in regions corre-
sponding to these early topographically mapped areas.
Recently, Kosslyn et al. [4] have carried this further and
produced direct evidence for topographic mapping of
visual imagery: if an object that extends over a wide area
of visual field is imagined, the activity in these early areas
extends more widely than if the imagined object sub-
tends a more limited visual angle. This is a dramatic
result, and gives strong impetus to the pictorialist view. I
shall consider some of its implications here.
Some of the cortical regions involved in visual processing
are shown in Figure 1, beginning with the first of the corti-
cal visual areas, V1. As has been known since Hubel and
Wiesel’s famous work [5], many of the neurons in V1
respond to edges, that is, to boundaries between regions of
different brightness. If a small part of the retina is stimu-
lated with a bar of light, the activity in V1 will be localized
to a small region, and as the bar is moved around the activ-
ity in V1 shifts, thereby mapping out a correspondence
between the retina and V1.
One could reasonably argue that V1 carries a pictorial rep-
resentation of the visual sensory data; a visual image
creates a pattern of activity in V1 which could be viewed
as a sort of cartoon illustration (Fig. 1). But there is also an
element of symbolic encoding in V1, because neurons
signal other information besides the retinal location of the
stimulus; they may respond to a particular direction of
motion, for example, or to stereoscopic depth, or colour.
As one progresses through visual areas [6,7], the map by
retinal position gets more imprecise and the neural encod-
ing more complex [8], until, in the inferotemporal cortex
(IT), neurons seem to be concerned with object recogni-
tion, and any identifiable topographic order seems to
relate to abstract properties of the image rather than
retinal location. 
To locate the brain activity underlying visual imagery,
Kosslyn et al. [4] used positron emission tomography
(PET) to determine regional blood flow (a measure of
local neuronal activity) when subjects performed an
imagery task. The subjects were given a set of pictures to
memorize, and were then asked to form a mental image of
one of these pictures and to answer a simple question
about it, such as “is the extreme right-hand point of the
image higher than the extreme left-hand point?” They
were also asked to visualise the image at one of three
sizes, having previously been shown cardboard squares
subtending ¼, 4 or 16 degrees of visual angle. 
While engaged in this task, the subjects inhaled 15O-
labelled CO2. A larger amount of labelled compound
accumulates in regions of high blood flow, and these
regions can then be pinpointed, to a resolution of about
0.5 cm, by gamma rays released by the decay of the
radioactive oxygen. As the difference in position between
points of V1 that correspond to the fovea and the periph-
ery of the visual field is some 3–4 cm, this resolution
would be sufficient to detect the difference in extent
between the different-sized mental images, assuming
that they were mapped onto the cortex in the same
fashion as retinal images. Kosslyn et al. [4] reported that
the mental images induced activity in many cortical areas,
including early, retinally mapped areas. In particular, the
differently sized mental images produced activity in V1
that was in accord with that area’s retinal mapping, lying
in the region closest to the back of the head for small
images, and extending further forward for larger images.
Other groups besides Kosslyn’s have investigated the
question of whether imagery can induce activity in V1,
and there have been opposing claims (see, for example
[9,10]). What make the new results particularly convinc-
ing are, firstly, the use of a new type of control condition
which seems to provide a more reliable baseline for
measuring activity in V1 against, and secondly, the direct
evidence for retinal mapping.
How might imagery-induced brain activity in early visual
areas be generated? Visual memory for objects is thought
to reside in the higher cortical regions, such as IT, that
lie at the end of the processing chain. It is a reasonable
supposition that the act of recollecting a memorized
image should activate IT, and a supporter of the sym-
bolic side of the imagery debate might well have
expected the activity to have been confined to IT and
other higher cortical regions. That it is not points the
finger of suspicion at a feature of cortical areas that I
have not mentioned yet: for every connection between
cortical areas that goes forward in the processing stream,
there is one going back [7]. It is striking that the feed-
back pathways are often as large as the feedforward ones
in numbers of axons. It is tempting, therefore, to think
that the feedback pathways might be involved in mental
imagery.
At this point is it helpful to ask about the relationship of
imagery to normal vision. There is evidence [3,11] that
imagery can assist perception by creating expectations
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Figure 1
At the top left, a few of the visual areas in the
cortex of the macaque are shown, as arranged
in the brain and more schematically, with
arrows representing the flow of neural
information. V1 is the primary visual cortex; V2
to V5 specialize in aspects of the image, like
motion (V5) and colour (V4) [6]; VP is the
ventral posterior area; VOT is the ventral
occipitotemporal area; and IT is the
inferotemporal cortex. For every arrow in the
feedforward direction (from V1 to IT), there is
one in the reverse direction; this causes no
confusion about the direction of processing,
because the anatomy of the two types of
connection is distinct [7]. In the lower half of
the figure are sketched the activity patterns
that might be expected in primary visual cortex
(V1, left) and inferotemporal cortex (IT, right)
in response to an image (upper right: Albrecht
Dürer’s Great Triumphal Car, featuring what is
perhaps one of the earliest instances of a
thought bubble). Also indicated, at the
bottom, are the types of visual stimulus
contained in the image that would be
expected to activate neurons, these being
edges in V1 [5] and more complex features in
IT [8], such as a neuron specific for an eye
(left) and one specific for a hand (right). Note
that the activity in V1 amounts to a sort of
cartoon of the image, whereas that in IT
represents the image symbolically, with no
relationship between the location in the cortex
of a neuron and the position of the stimulus it
responds to.
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about the incoming visual stimuli; for example, imagery
can indicate where parts of a figure might be expected to
lie when the figure is partly obscured. Might the
mechanism that does this operate not only in conscious
mode, when people picture things to themselves, but also
unconsciously, when the visual system tries to interpret a
complex object such as a face, for instance? Expectations
about where features of a face lie relative to one another,
where shading is to be expected, and so on, could be fed
back from higher-order visual memory to assist in
recognition. 
Ullman [12] and Mumford [13] have proposed computa-
tional models of this kind. Both envisage the feedback
cortical pathways transmitting back patterns of activity
that are compared with the incoming sensory data, and,
by a search process [12] or response to an error signal
[13], arriving at the best match between an abstract
representation in a higher area and the sensory data. The
models differ, in that Ullman’s makes a greater sep-
aration between forward and backward pathways, which
are thought of as countercurrent streams, whereas
Mumford’s has a more local, interactive character. But
they share the fundamental feature that they can be
viewed as generative models, in the sense that they gen-
erate in a lower area, via the backward pathways,
instances of the more abstract patterns in a higher area.
The ancestry of generative models can be traced back at
least forty years to ideas proposed by the psychologist
Donald MacKay [14], yet it is only recently that they
have begun to be explored as computational models of
the brain (see also [15]).
These models formulate the way that imagery-as-expecta-
tion could operate during sensory processing. They also
suggest how one might explain pure, eyes-closed visual
imagery: feedback would generate pictorial representa-
tions of objects from higher-order abstractions, and allow
geometrical questions to be asked about them, for
example “can we carry a piano up the apartment stairs?”
(to borrow an example of Mumford’s). Here, the models
would have to operate in a different mode, not attempting
to match sensory data; indeed, as MacKay [14] pointed
out, a mismatch signal could mark the distinction between
imagery and a true percept, and save us from confusing
imagination and reality. 
Perhaps many readers of Current Biology will feel, as
Galton’s scientific colleagues evidently did, that there is
not much resemblance between the sketchy phantoms of
our imagination and reality. We can only envy those with
the astonishing powers of visualization described in some
of Galton’s responses. Yet most of us have imagined
moving a heavy piece of furniture round an awkward
corner, and in doing so we have, perhaps, tapped into one
of the secrets of brain function.
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